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The Defense Identity Crisis:
It’s a Hybrid World
NATHAN FREIER
If at the end of the day, we drop the hybrid term and simply gain a better understanding of the large gray space between our idealized bins and pristine western
categorizations, we will have made progress.
—Frank Hoffman1

T

he defense enterprise is abuzz with lively debates on “hybrid threats”
and “hybrid war.” Yet, newly emergent defense trends do not automatically merit exquisite definitions, new doctrine, or new operating concepts.
As Frank Hoffman implies, such a caveat might be true of “hybrid warfare.”
Hybrid war may not yet be reducible to a pristine, doctrine-ready
definition. Continued efforts by Hoffman and others to describe it, however, remain invaluable.2 This trend is admittedly unsatisfying to concept
developers and doctrine writers. By nature, they want to neatly categorize
and define every aspect of military affairs. Yet, in this instance, patience
is a virtue. For its part, too, the defense bureaucracy cannot rush to artificially dismiss a wider universe of defense-relevant, “wicked” challenges,
in favor of a more limited and “tame” set of not-so-new, defense-specific
ones.3 Unfortunately, the hybrid debate is moving in this direction.
Too many analysts gravitate toward solving only narrow tacticalto-operational hybrid military problems. In that context, hybrid threats are
nettlesome “high-low” combinations of capabilities and methods—i.e., violent “irregular” forces that possess advanced military capabilities or “regulars” who skillfully combine conventional and unconventional warfare.
A similar “reduction” occurred with irregular warfare (IW) following the
2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. As a consequence, the Department of
Defense (DOD) quickly took refuge in IW’s “military science”—direct-acAutumn 2009
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tion counterterrorism, application of the military aspects of counterinsurgency, and security force assistance—without fully recognizing that DOD
would, under many circumstances, be responsible for much of IW’s “social science” as well. Following a similar course regarding hybrid challenges is a grave mistake.
Any rush to define DOD’s “hybrid” challenge too precisely is a diversion for a Defense Department facing more fundamental issues. It is
unclear whether hybrid military threats will ever be singular points of emphasis for doctrine, concepts, or material solutions. For many strategists,
the defense challenges described as hybrid are actually examples of cunning leadership in opposition to US or western military superiority.4 What
is clear, however, upon even a cursory examination of current and future
operating environments, is that the word hybrid itself aptly describes the
majority of DOD’s contemporary missions and responsibilities. In short,
war alone is not the only thing that is hybrid; an array of broader defense
issues is hybrid as well.
The defense portfolio is irrevocably diverse. It should be permanently acknowledged as such in defense management practices. DOD in
totality—its subordinate service departments and agencies, varied capabilities, and mosaic of existing military and nonmilitary missions—is a complex hybrid national security, vice national defense, institution.5 Defense
capacity and demands suggest that DOD could be thought of as the “Department of Doing or Defending Against Many Things.”6
For better or worse, DOD is America’s most viable first responder.
It is in the unenviable position of “if not you, then who” when contingency events involve major violence or conditions exceed the capacity of US
government agencies or foreign partners. An undeniable strategic reality
for DOD today is: If a contingency is big, bad, sudden, complex, expensive, actually or potentially violent, and strategically important, it is likely
to vault to the top of the Defense priority list. Few of the world’s problems
are unambiguously nails. As a consequence, DOD can ill afford to make
use of its “hammer” alone.
The following partial list of current challenges shows which agency is perceived as best-equipped to respond.
• Opposed or unopposed stability operation: DOD.
• Counterinsurgency: DOD.
Nathan Freier, a former Army strategist, is a Visiting Research Professor at the US
Army War College Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and a Senior Fellow
in the Defense and National Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies.
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• Coercive campaign: DOD.
• Response to widespread pandemic or disaster: DOD.
• Backstopping civil authorities in domestic catastrophes: DOD.
• Major combat operations: DOD.
An effective US government response, even to the most nonmilitary situation among these, is unimaginable without substantial DOD involvement.
The burning question in this regard revolves around whether DOD
actually recognizes its degree of involvement to the extent necessary to achieve
effective, risk-informed strategy development and strategic planning. The answer is likely “no.” Most defense debates avoid questions of “first principles.” Such principles commonly are threats to an agency’s budget, culture,
and core competencies. Yet, one inescapable first principles question needs
to be addressed. If the modern DOD remit is a complex politico-military
hybrid, then what exactly does that mean for the entire defense enterprise
in the future?
Critical supporting questions include: What is DOD’s unique contribution to national security in an environment populated by fewer defensespecific threats? Among external defense-relevant demands, which are
most likely and most dangerous?7 Does DOD define “dangerous” properly? Is the distinction between likely and dangerous still relevant?8 Against
which of DOD’s many projected demands should it be most ready? Formally asking and answering these inquiries will help the Department of
Defense account for the general hybridization of its entire external challenge set, most of its missions, and many of its material and human assets.
DOD’s Role in a Hybrid Environment
It is difficult to classify DOD’s strategic focus today. Defense capabilities are placed into action to secure vulnerable core interests for a
variety of reasons, under wide-ranging circumstances. Core interests of
note range from the physical security of American citizens, territory, and
allies; US sovereignty and the security of political institutions; continued
prosperity; and, controversially, securing aspects of the global economy
against disruption. In practice, DOD leads, enables, underwrites, or supports comprehensive US government responses to threats to the whole list
of interests. The bright lines that at one time separated civilian and military responsibilities are less distinct in the post-9/11 environment. This is
especially true in areas such as counterinsurgency, stabilization and reconstruction, homeland defense and security, and cyber defense.
Clearly, DOD’s strategic focus shifted in the last eight years, from
a traditional military orientation to a more balanced “traditional-irregular”
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worldview. The certainty of persistent change in strategic conditions, however, justifies even greater adjustment. Today’s environment demands that
defense leaders persistently evaluate the validity of their worldview, recalibrate their strategic outlook as required, and then redefine and reprioritize
defense missions and champion new capabilities where appropriate.
We are at a break point today in this regard. Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy and Shawn Brimley, a key adviser,
recently offered their thoughts on what they believe to be a new, expansive, and expanding defense portfolio. They observed:
In broad terms . . . the US military will increasingly face three types of challenges: rising tensions in the global commons; hybrid threats that contain a
mix of traditional and irregular forms of conflict; and the problem of weak
and failing states.9

Defense challenges manifesting from these three categories have
nonmilitary and military components. By definition, all are defense-relevant hybrids both in their character and the character of likely US responses.10 Indeed, responses to any of the three, whether defense-led or
defense-enabled, require blended military and nonmilitary designs. Frank
Hoffman’s description of hybrid foreign conflict captures the complexity
of modern defense demands:
(T)he evolving character of conflict . . . is best characterized by convergence.
This includes the convergence of the physical and psychological, the kinetic
and nonkinetic, and combatants and noncombatants. So, too, we see the convergence of military force and the interagency community, of states and nonstate actors, and of the capabilities they are armed with.11

Today, defense challenges not only exhibit convergence of incongruous forces, as Hoffman suggests, but also the promise of simultaneous,
resource-intensive demands across competing theaters.12 In the end, it is
not just war that is increasingly hybrid, as Flournoy, Brimley, and Hoffman argue. Rather, DOD more generally navigates an environment dominated by myriad compound or hybrid challenges and responsibilities.13
Most, if not all, are irresolvable through the use of military force alone.
All, however, do require DOD’s attention; and many, if not most, require
its leadership.
Many of DOD’s new compound demands are of a nonmilitary nature. Nonmilitary status, however, only implies that their principal origins
are not related to the armed forces of enemy states. It does not mean the
new challenges are always nonstate or prevalently nonviolent, purposeless, disorganized, or nonthreatening. Though nonmilitary in character, the
most difficult of these challenges defy favorable resolution unless skillful,
84
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Many of DOD’s enduring responsibilities
stem from long-recognized gaps in the broader
capacity of the US government agencies.

discriminating, and innovative military resources are applied in combination with the other instruments of national power. In these cases, “military
resources” do not automatically imply military force, though satisfactory
outcomes in many cases still rely on the use or threatened use of force.
Nonmilitary hybrids can take form as irreducible combinations of
violence and human insecurity. Some emerge as purposeful acts focused
specifically against the United States or its interests—e.g., insurgency, terrorism, and strategically significant criminality. Other nonmilitary hybrid
threats emerge without specific anti-US purpose—e.g., foreign insurrection, civil war, or unrest; state weakness and failure; and natural or human
catastrophe. The context or circumstances under which conflicts or emergencies like these occur are themselves the principal enemy actors. Adverse political, social, economic, or natural conditions initiate, enable, and perpetuate
these challenges. All result in some loss of order, and all can be violent. In
the end, however, violence may only be a symptom of chronic “contextual” disease. When this is the case, the DOD cannot ignore varying levels
of responsibility for addressing each of the aspects of the hybrid whole. At
times, DOD may be the only agency of note with “skin in the game.”
As Hoffman and others suggest, in any of these environments,
purposeful adversaries, spoilers, and contenders for local control might
employ hybrid combinations of lethal and nonlethal methods and capabilities to pursue their ends.14 Thus, against hybrid threats of purpose or
context, there will be certain security functions that military forces are
best postured to perform. Frequently, these functions will entail a great
deal of “warfighting.”
Hybrid military challenges also threaten core national interests via
the adversaries’ novel blending of traditional, irregular, catastrophic, or
disruptive capabilities and methods.15 These methods commonly emanate
from nation-states. The most prominent threats in this group are now referred to as high-end asymmetric threats.16 As with defense-relevant nonmilitary challenges, addressing the new-age, hybrid military threat requires
more skill, discrimination, and innovation on the part of American defense
and military leaders. Indeed, it might be useful to recognize that the purely
military aspects of hybrid, high-end challenges, e.g., a hostile state’s armed
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forces, may be peripheral to the actual conflict or competition.17 Instead,
these components might be diversions or foils employed by adversaries to
increase US risk calculations or capture US attention while the real “war”
occurs in other domains—politics, economics, social action, etc. The current American defense strategy, for example, suggests that purposeful adversaries might “[manipulate] global opinion using mass communications”
or “[exploit] international commitments and legal avenues.”18 The steady
march of nuclear proliferation may be one indication of this trend.
To date, the US government has not broken conceptual ground in
determining the proper DOD role under conditions where the United States
is ambiguously at war with another power; enjoys no real casus belli justifying military action; and recognizes that use of force entails high physical costs, potentially unacceptable political risks, and an uncertain prospect
for minimum essential success. Again, the current national defense strategy
presents this challenge rhetorically when it observes, “We may not learn that
a conflict is underway until it is well advanced and our options limited.”19
Thus, in a contemporary context, the word “Defense” in “Department of Defense” implies “defending [the United States and its interests]
against attack, danger, or injury”20 emanating from myriad threats (e.g.,
traditional military aggression, insurgency, cyber attack, insurrection,
pandemic, natural or human disaster, or sudden political failure abroad).
Often, the DOD is not the first or optimal line of defense but instead an instrument of last or only resort given the scale and complexity of specific
contingencies. DOD has explicit and implicit responsibilities for nuclear
deterrence; major combat operations; counterinsurgency; large-scale stability and peace operations; foreign engagement, routine civil affairs, and
security force assistance; humanitarian and disaster relief; and homeland
defense and security. Defense responses within this environment are as diverse as the potential contingencies: to defeat purposeful US adversaries;
protect vulnerable populations; engage foreign governments and security
forces; build foreign civil and military capacity; provide essential public
goods during contingencies; manage consequences; and enable employment of US government interagency and international resources. When examined overall, DOD’s mission set no longer fits neatly inside the narrow
confines of “military affairs.”
To be sure, some traditional military missions remain. Many other
explicit or implicit defense responsibilities, however, are not so traditional. In truth, most defense demands are something quite different from traditional warfighting. It is not yet clear, however, whether DOD corporately
accepts this notion and, thus, is postured to operationalize it. An important
first step for DOD is recognizing and coming to terms with its reinterpreted hybrid reality. This new recognition will certainly affect the Depart86
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ment’s culture, structure, material solutions, and human capital. A second
step is an honest, unconstrained examination by DOD of its future role in
an external security environment with fewer overt military threats and an
internal policy environment where flat or declining discretionary resources are inescapable realities. The latter is true throughout our government. In
fact, key government agencies, long-expected to help in relieving some of
the demands on DOD in the future, are likely to be significantly impacted by
resource constraints.
Risk, DOD, and the “One Percent” Contingency
Defense demands long ago outstripped the missions envisioned by
the 1947 National Security Act. As a consequence, the DOD can no longer project relevance, evaluate readiness, or measure risk based solely on a
definition of warfighting.
There is already a movement inside and outside the Pentagon regarding the lack of preparedness for high-end, traditional military conflict.
The strategic and operational-level frustrations associated with irregular
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan might convert some of this concern regarding readiness into a reversal back to a primary focus on a “big war”
status quo, a move that is totally inappropriate for any reasoned assessment of strategic circumstances. In spite of recent experiences, many still
consider traditional military readiness—e.g., the capacity of the joint force
to militarily succeed against state-based, armed opponents—to be the standard for meaningful risk assessment. In this context, major combat operations are established exclusively (and artificially) as the sole contingencies
the United States cannot afford to “lose.”
This is an important but grossly inadequate view of risk. It flows
from natural and understandable military conservatism. It is divorced from
objective senior-level judgments on the likelihood, preventability, or strategic impact of specific potentialities. Finally, it is rooted more in military
culture and tradition than strategic priorities. Rarely are risk assessments
based on prospective performance in alternative, predominantly irregular,
defense-relevant emergencies where favorable outcomes are less definable
and certain—e.g., containing the hazards associated with the collapse of
a nuclear state, restoring responsible control over its arsenal, reestablishing essential stability; halting and reversing widespread civil violence in
a state (or region) whose stable functioning is essential to US security; or
underwriting American civil authorities crippled by a resource-intensive,
multistate domestic catastrophe. Today, all of these hazards are as compelling and equally, if not more likely to be, a point of defense failure than
traditional warfighting.
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Indeed, in practice, many of DOD’s most
urgent and strategically consequential demands
do not conform to traditional military outlook.
As previously offered, whether it acknowledges the fact or not, the
Department of Defense remains the United States’ only global first responder capable of meeting the wide array of threats. In that capacity, it is responsible to the President and the American people for marshalling, enabling, or
supporting US government responses to the “one percent” defense-relevant
emergencies that cannot be resolved without meaningful DOD action. One
percent is intended to suggest rare large-scale contingencies with strategic
impact. While DOD’s overarching responsibility remains defending core
national interests against military attack, that responsibility and the waning
likelihood that DOD will have to act on it cannot be critically examined
without some reference to contemporary context.
While traditional missions endure—e.g., nuclear deterrence, coercive campaigns, and limited conventional war—the joint force is quite
busy operating outside the traditional warfighting arena. The Navy is chasing pirates. The Air Force is gathering information and remotely killing
terrorists and insurgents. The Army and Marine Corps are now expert
counterinsurgents, military advisers, and conflict stabilizers; and acceleration of these trends is more likely than not.
There are still, however, inviolable civil-military boundaries. For
example, DOD is not and should never be a tool for domestic law enforcement or intelligence gathering, nor should it ever be an instrument for the
routine delivery of development assistance abroad. Other risk, cost, and interest thresholds exist where a military response (no matter how benign) is
unnecessary and counterproductive. But, naturally, there are a great many
loosely controlled similitudes between these tasks and general war. Indeed,
in practice, many of DOD’s most urgent and strategically consequential
demands do not conform to the traditional military outlook. The missions
that do conform, however, are among the least likely “one percent” emergencies and, not surprisingly, also among DOD’s most excessively anticipated contingencies.
Warfare, as DOD officials and military leaders commonly think
of it, is now defense’s “lesser included” contingency. Admittedly, it is the
only threat DOD holds exclusive rights to ameliorate. It is also potentially
the most lethal contingency for those Americans who execute the missions.
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But military lethality alone does not automatically make warfare strategically the “most dangerous.”21
Recall that the “most likely-most dangerous” dichotomy is a product of tactical military doctrine.22 The terms describe enemy courses of action vis-à-vis friendly. Judgments regarding the most likely enemy courses
of action arrive via synthesis of friendly plans, enemy objectives, enemy
doctrine, and the options available to enemy commanders given real threat
capabilities, physical constraints—geography, weather, etc.—and leadership. Likewise, tactical decisions related to the most dangerous threats
stem from innovative applications of enemy doctrine, capabilities, and
leadership, given the same physical constraints. These threats, if they come
to fruition, would be more surprising, costly, and disruptive. To tactical
commanders, the most costly and disruptive events—i.e., the most dangerous—are also the most lethal.
The Secretary of Defense often is required to make a more complex
“likely vs. dangerous” calculation. As with the tactical commander, he has
finite resources. Unlike the tactical commander, however, he weighs the
relative importance and value of competing and often dissimilar mission
sets, across a near limitless spectrum of responsibility, and then identifies
the appropriate approach or contribution to each. Defense-relevant events
that are not immediately harmful to US citizens or forces can still be quite
costly and strategically disruptive. By their very existence, they may demand sizeable resources. For example, an uncontrolled public health emergency in North America, a bloodless but crippling cyber campaign against
critical US and allied infrastructure, or the violent dissolution of a nuclear
or petroleum state could be as geo-strategically disruptive as any prospective “United States vs. State X” conflict.
At the strategic level, likely and dangerous are merging as well.
Today, for example, threats considered increasingly likely—e.g., a surreptitious weapons of mass destruction attack against the United States or an
ally—are from a general security perspective also considered among the
most dangerous. On the other hand, those threats traditionally labeled most
dangerous because of some absolute judgment on military lethality might
pale in significance so long as they remained below the nuclear threshold.
US participation in a war between Taiwan and China comes to mind in
this regard. There are potential exceptions, which need to be the targets of
prudent deterrence. None of these illustrations (and they are only illustrations) are the purview of the Defense Secretary alone; yet, depending on
outcomes, all fall into the category of “if not you, then who.”
None of this is meant to suggest that the threat of traditional war
is inconsequential. It does suggest, however, that war is more manageable
Autumn 2009
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than active challenges that usher in national catastrophe without known
sponsors or casus belli, emerge from networked actors operating outside or below the state system, or arise in the complete absence of hostile design. To offset the marginal risk of military aggression, the United
States still requires unmatched capacity to wage devastating, but limited,
traditional campaigns. Given the character of many if not most defenserelevant challenges, however, there is some question as to how much traditional capability is enough. At what point does more become irrelevant,
wasteful, and irresponsible?
Five Immutable Defense Truths
It is clear that DOD cannot sacrifice its role as the armed defender
of US interests against military aggression. It is also clear, however, that
many defense demands beyond traditional warfighting are equally, if not
more, threatening to core US interests. If DOD continues to peg its corporate relevance exclusively on an adjusted but still traditional concept
of warfighting, it risks institutionalizing underpreparedness for a growing
number of hybrid missions. Toward this end, in ongoing defense reviews,
DOD leaders would be well-advised to keep five immutable truths in mind
when considering the hybridization of defense.
First, DOD will be the responder of choice in most one percent
contingencies threatening America’s national interests. There is no true interagency cavalry waiting over the hill to save the day. DOD’s resources,
capabilities, capacity, and unity of command—especially when compared
with other US instruments of power—persistently expose it to consecutive
call-ups when the Secretary of Defense is asked, “If not you, then who?”
This circumstance is not optimal, but it is a fact. The greater the potential for violence and strategic harm, the likelier it is that DOD will be the
respondent. As a consequence, DOD should incorporate the widest range
of contingencies in its strategic planning, capabilities development, and
risk assessment.
Second, regardless of lingering and understandable bias toward preparing for classical and now “neo-classical” warfare (major combat operations, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism), there will continue to be
a persistent demand on DOD’s total capability. This is difficult for many
in the executive department to understand, because they have been granted authority to define, and by implication limit, their own missions, often giving their subordinate agencies and services the same latitude. For
the foreseeable future, DOD will either lead or act as the key enabler in
US government and international responses to disruptive and dangerous
threats around the globe. The reality is that either the United States re90
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Many of DOD’s new “compound” demands
are of a “nonmilitary” nature.
sponds to these tough, resource-intensive missions with DOD capabilities
or the job will not get done.
Again, this forced choice is regrettable. It is, however, unavoidable.
DOD is loath to embrace this reality. As a result, it is inclined to assume
away a number of future contingency responsibilities. Failure to embrace
this reality and recognize it as enduring will only exacerbate the genetic
tendency to under-value, under-resource, and under-prepare for these missions. DOD leaders need to face reality and cease identifying such missions as falling outside the bounds of legitimate warfighting missions.
Third, military forces of enemy states are increasingly less likely to
be the central players in the majority of defense-relevant, one percent contingencies. Never say never, but do not assume always. Because hostile
militaries will remain a legitimate threat, DOD is obligated to devote resources to counter them. The Department should, however, recognize that
countering hostile states is the “lesser included” defense contingency. The
often heard argument that DOD can stumble and still recover in the execution of almost any mission except “the big one” implies the “big one” is
likely to look more like World War II than a collapsing Yugoslavia, more
like Phase III of Operation Iraqi Freedom than Phase IV, or more like the
air campaign in Kosovo than a deadly and virulent H1N1 outbreak. Observers of defense trends, including the Secretary of Defense, do agree on
one issue; the next all-consuming contingency will not be a major confrontation between great powers.
Fourth, counterinsurgency (COIN) is a necessary capability but
grossly insufficient to be considered the dominant irregular warfare paradigm.23 Counterinsurgency has become a default replacement for major
combat operations (MCO) among DOD strategists searching for the next
one percent IW contingency. As with regime-change MCO, any future US
intervention on behalf of a classical counterinsurgent is less likely than
COIN advocates want to acknowledge.
Both MCO and COIN imply a sufficient and continuing response
to an unfavorable but still functioning capacity to govern in the afflicted
nation. Less well-developed conceptually, however, is the understanding
of how US interests may be threatened, or how DOD might need to respond to the lack of governance or order in a key state or region. Neither
traditional military threats nor classical insurgent successes compromise
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core national interests. Instead, interests are threatened by the rapid, uncontrolled dissolution of a critical ally, neutral state, or hostile third party. In a number of these situations there may not be a foreign government
to partner with, as the basic COIN doctrine often assumes. The sources of
this violent opposition and resistance are numerous. The situation may be
such that all parties will resist US-led intervention, while simultaneously competing with each other. The foremost objective of intervention is
containing and managing further deterioration and escalation. In the end,
limited resources, scale, complexity, and risk all serve to constrain stabilization, reconstruction, and capacity-building capabilities outlined in COIN
and stability operations doctrine.
Finally, the increased prominence of hybrid, one percent contingencies in strategy and planning requires that DOD share its responsibility to
lead with others. In sufficiently stable contingency environments abroad or,
in the event of a major catastrophe at home, DOD organizations have to become more comfortable with the prospect of being operationally employed
under the authority of nonmilitary leaders and agencies. This new relationship will ultimately require changes in US law and military tradition.
Increasing nondefense responsibility in complex contingencies and
a lowering of the defense profile requires that DOD cede much of its authority governing defense capabilities when deployed in support of civilian authorities at home and abroad. The military would continue providing
security, labor, staff support, logistics, and command and control capabilities under the strategic-through-tactical control of civilian leaders. One lingering conceit in DOD, however, is that America’s military should only
be deployed to conduct combat operations. It is likely that the Department
of Defense will continue to be portrayed as the single federal agency with
relatively unrestricted resources to be employed regardless of the conditions or circumstances. If this trend continues, nonmilitary actors need to
become more adept at directing the employment of military forces in nonstandard and nonmilitary roles.
Conversely, defense and military leaders need to be more competent in the employment of nonmilitary resources in defense-led, wholeof-government operations. In contingencies relying on the use of military
force to address pervasive disorder and violence, and where a lack of security precludes the independent employment of civilian agencies (e.g., highintensity COIN, violent state collapse, or intervention in a civil war), DOD
and deployed military forces need to become more adept at integrating and
employing US government and foreign civil capabilities in military-led
contingencies. This approach begins with strategy development, design,
and campaign planning and culminates in operational execution. Naturally,
92
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any initial leadership by Department of Defense organizations should revert to civilian control as soon as practical.
Conclusion
History and recent experience point toward a defense future where
DOD alternates between the roles of first responder, integrator, and key enabler for any number of one percent contingencies. There are few modern
security challenges that conform to defense-specific solutions, yet DOD is
often pushed forward as the most capable instrument in the contingency
tool box. For the foreseeable future, the Department of Defense will be
the central player in whole-of-government contingencies involving political, economic, military, intelligence, and development resources, as well
as civilian resources and methodologies. Many of DOD’s enduring responsibilities stem from long-recognized gaps in the broader capacity of the US
government agencies. Current and projected fiscal realities indicate these
gaps will continue.
For the one percent emergencies, US planners and decisionmakers have no viable alternative. This realization will remain true for some
time and should become a permanent feature of defense strategy and contingency planning. Within DOD, such a stance is contrary to culture and
minimally considered. It clearly presents DOD leadership with several uncomfortable strategic challenges. Key among them are how should strategy, planning, and risk assessment accommodate a wider array of hybrid
missions and, by implication, what capabilities should DOD retain, improve, initiate, discontinue, or transform as a result?24 Every modern Secretary of Defense should anticipate the inevitable question: “If not you, then
who?” It is only a matter of time before he or she is asked.
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